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Research Digest
This is the fourth installment of Negotiation Journal’s new section of
research digests. Our purpose in publishing the digests is to disseminate
some of the most recent research findings in our field. We have attempted
to communicate technical research in a manner that would reach the
diverse readership of Negotiation Journal. We hope that we have accom-
plished this goal and that you find the information useful — both in terms
of keeping up with the latest findings and consulting articles of particular
interest.We look forward to receiving feedback from our readers about the
value of this section as well as ideas on how the digests can be improved.
We also welcome suggestions for articles (from any peer-reviewed journal)
on negotiation and related topics to be summarized in future issues. Feel
free to drop us a line at the Journal from time to time.
Daniel Druckman and Nancy J.Waters
Real-Time, Real Competitive
With the rise and spread of the Internet, increasing numbers of geographi-
cally dispersed individuals can cooperate and interact at low cost and with
virtually no time delay. Internet-based negotiations have become standard
operating procedure for many businesses and individuals in this new
economy. While most scholars accept that there are differences between
online versus face-to-face negotiations, there are two discrete forms of
online negotiation utilized today. One is a synchronous form, or real-time
chat-type conversation, and the other is asynchronous, or e-mail conducted
interactions that occur over several hours, days, or weeks.
To understand the impact of real-time synchronous negotiating
versus asynchronous negotiating on outcomes, Eva-Maria Pesendorfer and
Sabine Koeszegi conducted one hundred online negotiations simulations
with fifty negotiations of each “type” (synchronous versus asynchronous)
using participants from Europe and the Far East who did not know each
other. The negotiations were all based on a simple buyer–seller relation-
ship where each had a reasonable alternative to reaching an agreement,
but were not given a strategy or goal other than for the buyer to receive
a low price. By evaluating the transcriptions of the negotiations, the
researchers found a few marked differences between the two forms of
online negotiation.
Not surprisingly, communications were textually shorter in synchro-
nous communications than in asynchronous negotiations. Surprisingly,
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however, synchronous negotiations produced more positive and negative
affective statements as well as fewer thanking and apology type statements;
in essence, negotiating online in real-time produced more uninhibited
behavior. In line with this behavioral finding is the other finding by the
researchers: negotiators in synchronous communications were more offen-
sive and more competitive in their communications. While they were also
more empathetic in their language, their aggressive behavior is considered
tactical and true to the increased competitive nature of these synchronous
negotiations. Finally, negotiators in this mode felt less satisfied with their
results and experienced negotiations that they perceived were significantly
less friendly.
Real-time online negotiations enable participants access to an environ-
ment encompassing perhaps the worst of all worlds. Negotiators not only
have the anonymous freedom to act with little regard for their counter-
parts, but they also feel empowered to react in the most competitive
fashion. Asynchronous negotiators have more time to reflect, cool down,
and control their emotions.
Source: Pesendorfer, E. and S. Koeszegi. 2006. Hot versus cool behavioral
styles in electronic negotiations: The impact of communication mode.
Group Decision and Negotiation 15: 141–155.
Key words: electronic negotiation, communication mode, behavioral
styles, content analysis, computer-mediated communication (CMC),
escalation.
Just Trust Me
A short story by John Updike begins with the admonition that the two
scariest words in the English language are “trust me.” Trust is accepted as
a critical component of negotiations, particularly those involving impor-
tant public policy issues and coalitions. Scholars have focused on two
distinct factors in building trust in political actions requiring consensus
building among varying factions: institutional rational choice and social
psychology. While both traditions view trust as a precursor to consensus
building, institutional rational choice explains how trust arises based
on institutional rules and evidence of the other party’s trustworthiness,
where social psychology explains the development of distrust as a
result of differing values or lack of faith in the decision-making
process.
In an attempt to identify specific precursors of interpersonal trust,
William D. Leach and Paul A. Sabatier utilized explanatory variables from
both institutional rational choice and social psychology in their study of
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seventy-six randomly sampled watershed stakeholder partnerships from
California and Washington. By understanding the agreements and the
process the parties took to achieve agreements, the researchers found the
presence of several elements increased trust.
Interestingly, trust was found to increase in institutional rational trust
predictors, that is, when the participants perceive the process as fair and
legitimate, when there are clear rules for how decisions will be made, and
when the participants expect to be working together for an extended
period of time. Similarly, as social psychology predicts, trust was increased
when the stakeholders believed in the legitimacy and fairness of the con-
sensus process. The researchers conclude that while both traditions offer
good elements to enhance or develop trust in collaborative negotiations,
the social psychologists may have found slightly more reasons for parties to
trust each other.
Source: Leach, W. D. and P. A. Sabatier. 2005. To trust an adversary: Inte-
grating rational and psychological models of collaborative policymaking.
American Political Science Review 99(4): 491–503.
Key words: trust, institutional rational choice, social psychology, collabo-
rative policymaking, stakeholder partnerships.
Dear Mediator . . . Should You Manipulate or Facilitate?
Mediators, of all people, often disagree on what constitutes best practice. A
recent study compared the effectiveness of three different approaches in
international crises: facilitation, formulation, and manipulation.
Facilitative mediation emphasizes continued dialogue and open infor-
mation sharing between disputants in search of a mutually acceptable
outcome. Formulation involves the mediator actively proposing a new
solution or advocating one from an existing array of alternatives. This form
of mediation allows coordination between the bargaining parties by struc-
turing the negotiations and refocusing the issues at hand to avoid any
impasse. Manipulation uses carrots and sticks to direct the negotiation and
leverage the position the mediator favors. A combination of these three
approaches is often used concurrently as they all serve to enhance the
likelihood of reaching an agreement.
Kyle C. Beardsley, David M. Quinn, Bidisha Biswas, and Jonathan
Wilkenfeld have tested their hypotheses regarding the various forms of
mediation using the International Crisis Behavior data set. Their overall
results showed unsurprisingly that mediated crises gave rise to more formal
agreements, greater reduction in postcrisis tensions, and a greater probabil-
ity of crisis abatement than did unmediated crises.
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Manipulation was found to be the most effective approach in reaching
an agreement and avoiding an imminent crisis, followed by formulation and
then facilitation. Manipulative mediation allows for a greater push to maxi-
mize the possible array of options on the bargaining table, thus increasing
the likelihood of agreement. But facilitation was more effective in reducing
tensions than either formulation or manipulation because external pres-
sures to reach an agreement induced by the latter approaches are not as
helpful for revealing each party’s situational constraints.
A combination of manipulation and facilitation may work best.Manipu-
lation serves to abate immediate crises,while facilitative methods are more
likely to generate long-term goodwill. The most effective form of crisis
management may be to use strong carrots and sticks to increase incentives
for agreement and prevent the breakdown of negotiations, and to use
facilitation in order to ensure sufficient transparency of information and
coordination to identify an agreement concordant with the interests and
situation of each party. Formulation on the other hand, while effective at
inducing formal agreements,may have less of an impact due to the surpris-
ing finding that tensions are not reduced with this method.
The results highlight the importance of facilitation inmaintaining lasting
peace and demonstrates the importance of passive third-party involvement.
Part of the mediator’s role should be to create an opportunity for the
disputants to meet and share information, without active enforcement or
intervention. Mediators should allow the involved parties to initiate the
proposal of solutions to ensure their long-term commitment to an agreement.
Source: Beardsley, K. C., D. M. Quinn, B. Biswas, J. Wilkenfeld. 2006. Media-
tion style and crisis outcomes. Journal of Conflict Resolution 50(1): 58–86.
Key words: mediation, manipulation, facilitation, formulation, crisis, inter-
national crises, conflict resolution.
Bringing “God” to and from the Negotiation Table
“Rational” or secular-based approaches to problem solving and negotiation
do not usually include ways in which a faith-based mind-set can be incor-
porated. Faith-based negotiators, while not abandoning rationality, view
their negotiation approaches as divine in origin, but their more secular
colleagues consider this logic “irrational.”
To bridge this divide, Melvin Shakun suggests bringing “God” to the
negotiation table. His core axiom is that all individuals have an inherent
ultimate purpose to experience spirituality: connectedness with One (God,
all there is), a default state that always returns with inner stillness, letting
problems go. Shakun suggests that bringing spirituality to negotiations
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promotes agreements that in turn produce (renew) spirituality lost in the
conflict leading to the negotiation table, thus bringing “God” from the
negotiation table.
Following the author’s Evolutionary Systems Design (ESD) framework,
each negotiator can construct a hierarchy of his own values rationally
related to one another and to the same shared highest value — connect-
edness with One — at the top of all negotiators’ hierarchies. In so doing,
faith-based negotiators frequently cite values rationally consistent with
God’s word or scriptures. In the resulting hierarchies,which negotiators are
free to communicate, discuss, and modify, some values (particularly high-
level ones) are shared by both faith-based and secular negotiators, and some
are not.
In his discussion, Shakun extends rationality, which is normally associ-
ated with cognition, to spiritual rationality, which a negotiator can validate
subjectively by cognition, affection, and conation, holistically and spiritu-
ally. Validation tests are presented in the article. With spiritual rationality, a
negotiator, whether faith-based or secular, validates a negotiation problem
solution both rationally and spiritually. If the solution is not valid, the
negotiator continues the negotiation. A validated spiritually rational solu-
tion produces spirituality — connectedness with One.
Faith-based or secular, each negotiator can achieve internal consistency
of rationality and spirituality. Conflict between negotiators can still exist.
However, their common adoption of spiritual rationality and the ESD frame-
work — providing a common methodology that highlights connectedness
and high-level values shared by individuals — can facilitate negotiation
problem evolution leading to an agreed-upon solution that is spiritually
rational for individuals.
Experience with applications supports the ESD/spiritual rationality
framework as leading to more and improved agreements (see references in
the source article).While some related controlled experiments are support-
ive of this framework, direct experimental verification is needed.
Source: Shakun, M. F. 2006. Spiritual rationality: Integrating faith-based and
secular-based problem solving and negotiation as systems design for right
action. Group Decision and Negotiation 15: 1–19.
Key words: spiritual rationality, right action (decision), faith-based/secular-
based problem-solving negotiation, Evolutionary Systems Design.
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